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THE DETERMINANTS OF SPREAD OF EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE — 
AN EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST OUTBREAK EXPERIENCES
Abstract: The paper summarizes available evidence regarding the determinants of spread of Ebola 
virus disease, including health care and community related risk factors. It was observed that the level 
of uncertainty for the estimations is relatively high which may hinder to make some predictions for 
the future evolution of EVD outbreak. The natural history of EVD has shown that the disease may 
pose a problem to developed countries and may present a thread to individuals. Although observed 
modes of transmission mainly include direct contact and contaminated staff, high case fatality ratio 
and frequent contacts among individuals in developed countries are among determinants which may 
lead to the development of the EVD outbreak.
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INTRODUCTION
The Ebola virus infection (EVI) has appeared as one of the emergency public 
health concern in 2014. The problem become to life with the development of 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in Africa recognized on March 10, 2014 in 
Guéckédou, Guinea [1]. The outbreak developed rapidly through unprotected 
borders to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and next, by the airline connection to Nige-
ria. In the period March 2014 till Aug. 1, 2014 the EVD was diagnosed and at-
tempted to fight down in African region only. Starting on Aug. 2, 2014 the first 
EV case was recognized in the US [2]. This event raised an emergency alert to 
health authorities. The current outbreak has been caused by the Zaire Ebola 
virus strain [3], which was observed to have very high case-fatality ratio (reach-
ing 89% [4]), therefore, a real threat to public health has been evolved. Several 
papers have been published and different possible scenarios for the EV spread 
have been proposed and discussed. Considering the fact, that the current EVD 
outbreak is still out of control (Nov., 2014), the aim for this manuscript was 
to summarize available knowledge about the chain of EV infection, to describe 
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determinants of the EVD spread, and to discuss the risk of EVD outbreak in 
developed countries.
THE SPREAD OF THE EV DISEASE
There are some components required for the development for every infectious 
disease. They are called as the chain of infection, which is defined as “a pro-
cess that begins when an agent leaves its reservoir or host through a portal of 
exit, and is conveyed by some mode of transmission, then enters through an 
appropriate portal of entry to infect a susceptible host” [5]. The Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention presents conditions which must be met in order for 
a microbe or infectious disease to be spread from person to person as causative 
agent, reservoir (source), portal of exit, mode of transmission, portal of entry and 
susceptible host [6]. Therefore, for the prevention and control measures every ele-
ment of the chain of infection should be carefully investigated and consequently, 
any possible preventive measures should be applied for every component of the 
process.
THE RESERVOIR (SOURCE)
The EVD is thought to be a zoonosis. Several investigations have been made to 
identify the reservoir of EV. Primates were considered as rather unlikely to be 
the reservoir as it was observed that they were susceptible to the development 
of the disease while infected [7]. Investigations have shown some evidence that 
fruit bats may be the reservoir of the Zaire EV. This was concluded after a dis-
covery of three tree-roosting species: Hypsignathus monostrosus, Epomops fran-
queti, and Myonycteris torquata having natural infection identified by the viral 
RNA and antibodies [8]. Some other evidence pointing on fruit bats comes from 
2007 and 2008. Investigation performed in Kitaka Cave in western Uganda fol-
lowing a limited outbreak of Marburg hemorrhagic fever identified Egyptian fruit 
bats, Rousettus aegyptiacus, as a possible reservoir for the Marburg virus (MV) 
— a virus from the “Ebola” group. This research provided additional knowledge, 
as researchers obtained positive isolates from R.aegyptiacus caught in August 
2007 and in May 2008 implying colonies of R.aegyptiacus could harbor MV for 
longer periods of time [9]. Other documented animal sources of epidemic point-
ed on chimpanzees, gorillas, monkeys, porcupines and forest antelopes. Detailed 
observations, however, have shown that these species should be considered as 
hosts rather instead of reservoir [10].
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THE TRANSMISSION PROCESS
One of the first known outbreak of EV in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
in 1976 was mainly attributed to the reuse of contaminated needles showing 
that blood was one of the important or even the major mode of transmission 
that time. The EV outbreak in 1979 appeared as a consequence of hospital 
dissemination of EV involving 5 families and the subsequent spread of the in-
fection among family members. On site evaluation revealed several risky con-
ditions at local hospital included no running water in the patient care areas, 
limited supply of masks, caps and gowns, a lack of routinely practice nursing 
barriers, infrequent sterilization of hospital instruments. It was observed that 
relatives of hospitalized patients frequently provided routine nursing practices 
as handling emesis, excreta and soiled clothing. The analysis of this outbreak 
revealed that close intimate contact with ill person associated with nursing 
care leaded to 5-fold increase in the risk of infection. It also suggested that 
the EV is not easily transmitted via the airborne route. Persons kept with 
EVD cases in poorly ventilated huts did not develop the disease unless they 
had a direct physical contact [11]. Next epidemic observed in Kikwit, a city 
of around 200.000 inhabitants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 
1995, enabled to identify and quantify exposures that were predictive of risk 
for secondary transmission of the EV. Analyses revealed that the major risk 
factor was a direct physical contact with an ill family member both, at home 
at less severe stages of the disease and in hospital at more severe stages. 
Other risky behaviors identified were: a) reported contact with body fluids of 
an ill person, b) being an adult family member, or c) sharing a bed during 
late illness, and in late stage of the disease d) sharing a meal, and e) having 
a conversation. Moreover, toughing of cadaver was also identified as a risk fac-
tor. The study of the 1995 outbreak did not find an increase in the risk associ-
ated with any exposure (considering conversation, sharing a bed and touching) 
during incubation period as well as exposures like sharing a meal, conversation 
and sharing a bed during an early illness [12].
As there were much more EVD outbreaks, some other risks have been iden-
tified and/or verified [13]. An investigation of the 2000/2001 Uganda outbreak 
additionally enabled to assess the length after the onset of the disease when 
the virus was observed by the culture or the RT-PCR in some specimens. The 
shorter time (of 6 days) was observed for skin during the acute disease, and the 
longer for semen in convalescents (being as long as 40 days). Another positive 
samples were saliva, breast milk, stool, tears, and nasal blood [14]. The summary 
of the identified risk factors and the associated increase in the risk is presented 
in Table 1.
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T a b l e  1
Risk factors for being infected by Ebola virus.
Risk increase (*) Reference
Exposure to contaminated medical 
instrument
7.4 (95% CI: 1.6–33.2)MV
[23]
Intimate contact associated with 
nursing care
5.1 (95% CI: 1.31–15.48)
[11]
Care for patient: p for trend <0.001
[13]
— cared only during patient’s earl 
     stage
6.00 (95% CI: 1.33–27.10)
— cared until the patient’s death  
    at hospital the hospital
8.57 (95% CI:1.95–37.66)
— cared until the patient’s death  
    at home
13.33 (95% CI: 3.20–55.59)
Direct physical contact with an 
ill family member (in home or at 
hospital)
29.5% of family members of this type 
contact became infected, but no-one with 
no such contact increase in the risk — 
undefined
[12]
Contact with body fluids of an ill 3.6 (95% CI: 1.9–6.8) [12]
5.30 (95% CI: 2.14–13.14) [13)
Being an adult family member 4.6 (95% CI: 2.0–10.3)
6.7 (95% CI: 2.4–18.4)
[12]
[24]
Sharing hospital bed 3.4 (95% CI: 1.8–6.2) [12]
Sleeping on the same mat 2.78 (95% CI: 1.15–6.70) [13)
Exposures during late illness:
[12]
— sharing a meal 2.2 (95% CI: 1.2–4.0)
— conversation 3.9 (95% CI: 1.2–12.2)
— sharing a bed 2.2 (95% CI: 1.2–4.2)
Cadaver toughing 2.1 (95% CI: 1.1–4.2) [12]
Ritual hand washing during funeral 2.25 (95% CI: 1.08–4.72) [13]
Communal meal during funeral 2.84 (95% CI: 1.35–5.98) [13]
CI — confidence interval; (*) — majority of these estimates are the results of univariable models, therefore they 
may account from other co-existing risk factors; MV — estimate for Marburg virus type
THE SUSCEPTIBLE HOST
The review of the currently available evidence does not reveal any known natural 
resistance for EV infection. Therefore, vaccination seems to be the only reason-
able solution for preventive measures in this area. Although there is no licensed 
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vaccine available to prevent EVD, a considerable progress has been observed in 
recent years. There are some vaccine platforms, which are currently under in-
vestigation including: virus-like particles (VLPs), Venezuelan equine encephalitis 
virus replicons (VEEV RP), replication competent recombinant human parainflu-
enza virus 3 (rHPIV3), replication incompetent adenovirus vectors, and recombi-
nant vesicular stomatitis virus (rVSV) [15–17]. Only two of the aforementioned 
vaccines presented promising results. The study of Recombinant Chimpanzee 
Adenovirus Serotype 3 Vectored Ebola Vaccine (cAd3 Ebola vaccine) has found 
that in non-human primates, which were given a lethal dose of EV, the vac-
cine protected, with a single treatment, of 100% of 16 laboratory animals. The 
second promising vaccine is recombinant VSVG-ZEBOV — in a pre-exposure 
pre-clinical study in 20 non-human primates this vaccine has shown the effica-
cy of 100%, and post-exposure vaccination has leaded to 50% survival rate [15]. 
Future results of human clinical trials will reveal the efficacy for these vaccines, 
however, these results have shown that some primary prevention strategies may 
be available soon [18].
NATURAL HISTORy OF EV INFECTION
The clinical course of the EV infection is presented in the other article in this 
issue, therefore, this paragraph is to present some data what is known about 
the dynamics of the spread of the disease across susceptible individuals. It is 
rather unlikely that EV has its own reservoir in North America or in European 
countries, therefore the risk of the spread of the EV infection in these regions is 
determined only by the ‘imported’ cases. In African region, however, where the 
EV disease causes outbreaks, some epidemiological data suggests the presence 
of some trigger factors causing spillover events of EV from a natural reservoir 
or from an intermediate host into men. Although these introductions were fre-
quently unrecognized or were not reported correctly, there are some observations 
suggesting that these events occurred with some pattern associated with clima-
tologic variables as quick shift from dry to wet conditions [19] or lower tempera-
ture and higher absolute humidity [20]. The risk of the transmission of the EV 
depends on the risky behaviors (see before and the Table 1) and the stage of the 
disease in the natural development of the EVD (Fig. 1). The determinants of the 
dynamic of transmission include: mode of transmission (see before), population 
density, frequency of contacts among individuals at the population level, infectiv-
ity of the pathogen (EV), and the susceptibility of the host (see before). Preven-
tive measures implemented at the population level may significantly change the 
dynamic of transmission. If there is no preventive measures, the average number 
of secondary cases in a completely susceptible population caused by a typical 
infected individual throughout the entire course of infection is called the basic 
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Fig. 1. The natural course of the EV infection and the associated risk of the EV transmission  
to susceptible individuals.
 
Time course of the 
EV infection [days] 
 
Infection of EV 
Incubation period (IP) 
 ~6-12 days 
The onset of the first 
signs/symptoms 
Early 
 (pre-hospital) 
stage 
Late (hospital) 
stage 
Death or recovery 
No ri sk Poss ible ri sk High ri sk 
Transmission possibility: 
  
 
 
Recovery 
High or some ri sk 
 up to 40 days  ~ 10 days 
Death 
 infectiousness 
 ~3 days Duration: 
T a b l e  2
Estimated basic reproductive numbers (R0) for EVD outbreaks.
Outbreak 
(year)
Basic reproductive number (R
0
)
Transmission  
rate 
(per week)
Reference
1976 Congo 4.71 
for community component 
(including funerals): 1.34
nd [25]
1995 Congo 1.83 2.31 [26]
3.07 nd [27)
2.7 
for community component: 0.5
9,04 
0.59
[4]
2000/2001 Uganda 1.34 0.38 [26]
2.7 4.01 [4]
for community component: 2.6 3.53
2.13 nd [27]
2014 Guinea 1.51 0.27 [28]
Sierra Leone 2.53 0.45 [28]
Liberia 1.59 0.28 [28]
nd — no data
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reproduction number (R
0
). The epidemic may develop only if R
0
>1, otherwise, the 
spread of the disease is self-limiting. The basic reproductive number calculated 
for the EVD has been estimated to range from 1.34 to 4.71 (Table 2). The basic 
reproduction number for the EV varied, depending on the mode of transmission 
which is the main determinant of the spread in the particular population. The 
highest R0 was observed for the 1976 outbreak caused mainly by the contaminat-
ed needles. At the population level, habitual contacts accounted for R
0
 of 0.5 in 
1995 Congo outbreak to 2.6 in 2000/2001 Uganda outbreak. Although the past 
EVD outbreaks were frequently self-limiting, the emergence of the EV infection 
spread in high density populations leads to the conclusion that the only solution 
is the implementation of extensive prevention and control measures.
THE POSSIBILITy OF THE EBOLA VIRUS OUTBREAK  
IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The health care in developed countries is much better organized and financed 
than in experiencing EVD outbreak African countries. Therefore, the possibility 
to prevent and control the development of EVD outbreak is incomparably higher 
in our region. Until Nov. 30, 2014 there are at least 22 known imported cases 
of EVD: 10 in the US [21], 3 in Spain, 3 in Germany, 2 in France and 1 in Brit-
ain, Norway, Switzerland and Italy [2]. All these countries developed very quickly 
every possible preventive measures. Additionally, intensive surveillance strategies 
have been implemented, and consequently, until now, there is no known spread 
of the EVD in these countries. As some of the ‘imported’ cases, before they devel-
oped clinical symptoms severe enough to raise awareness and to be hospitalized, 
had a contact with their family, co-workers and other people in the surrounding 
environment, there was a possibility to infect some other individuals. As it was 
rather unlikely, there is still open for discussion a possibility of the transmission 
of the EV from the infected person before the development of clinical symptoms. 
The investigation of 1995 EV outbreak showed that 4 family members, who had 
been exposed to infected person during pre-hospital phase only, developed the 
disease. As it was not recognized finally, when these 4 family members might 
have contact, there is no credibility, nowadays, for the lack of transmission in 
the early stages of the disease.
There are publications available, which show the scenarios of the development 
of the EVD outbreak in developed countries. Chowell and Nishiura in their re-
view published the ‘probability of no major outbreak’ in a population of 100.000 
associated with different determinants. Considering the size of the spillover event 
(the number of initial cases) they have calculated that this probability is higher 
than 60% for 1 initial case, but drops dramatically to approximately 20% for 3, 
and to 10% for 5 initial cases. Another critical component was the period between 
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the onset of EVD symptoms and the proper diagnosis of the disease. If this time 
takes 3 days instead of 1 the probability of ‘no major outbreak’ decreases by 
about 2.5-times. The crucial component mentioned by authors was the time from 
the spillover event to the implementation of control interventions. If the time 
equals 5 days there is almost no risk for the development of the EVD outbreak, 
however, if the delay prolongs to 33 days the probability of ‘no major outbreak’ 
goes below 25% [22].
SUMMARy
Available evidence regarding the risk quantification for different exposures to 
EV provides evidence with high level of uncertainty, which may hinder to make 
some predictions for the future evolution of EVD outbreak. The natural history 
of EVD has shown that the disease may pose a problem to developed countries 
and may present a thread to individuals. Although observed modes of transmis-
sion include direct contact and contaminated staff, high case fatality ratio and 
frequent contacts among individuals in developed countries are among determi-
nants which may lead to the development of the EVD outbreak. Therefore, the 
available knowledge about the spread of the EV support any increase in the ef-
fort to limit current EVD outbreak.
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